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The Proximity-Based Effect of Terrorism on Countries' Economies
Abstract
In this paper, I explore the effect that proximity to terrorist-controlled areas has on countries’ economies. I
posit that there exists a correlation between the aforementioned proximity and GDP growth rates, and
hypothesize that the closer a country is to an area with high levels of terrorism, the more likely it is that its
economy will be negatively affected. I begin by examining the nature of the correlation between terrorism and
economic growth; following this, I explore the direct ways in which terrorism affects economic growth. Next,
I delve into the recent economic history of countries around three areas: the Nigeria area, the Afghanistan-
Pakistan area, and the Iraq-Syria area. From my examinations of the GDP growth rates of the countries around
these areas, I find no uniform relationship between the countries’ proximity to their respective areas and their
GDP growth rates. To help explain this apparent lack of correlation, I look at other factors that influence GDP
growth rates and note that these factors may be overshadowing the effects of terrorism. I conclude that there is
no uniform relationship between a country’s proximity to high levels of terrorism and its GDP; although
terrorism can have effects on countries’ economies, those effects are often negligible compared to other
economic factors.
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The Proximity-Based Effect of Terrorism on Countries’ Economies 
Terrorism is an ever-growing issue that can have serious ramifications around the world; 
particularly interesting is the relationship between terrorism and economic growth. Specifically, I 
seek to explore the effects of extremely high levels of terrorism on the economies of the coun-
tries around it. This leads me to ask: How does proximity to strongly terrorist-controlled areas 
affect countries’ economies? I posit that there exists a correlation between the proximity to areas 
with very high levels of terrorism and a country’s GDP growth rates.  Understanding this rela-
tionship is important for better predicting what is most likely to happen to a country’s economy 
based on its proximity to an area with high levels of terrorist activity. If we can predict what will 
happen, it is possible that the country could better brace itself for potential economic deteriora-
tion, thus protecting its economy. This would be extremely useful and may even have an impact 
on the world, which is increasingly globalized and economically interconnected; if the economy 
of one country fails, the economies of others are likely to be affected. It seemed that there is a 
strong correlation between a country’s proximity to areas with high levels of terrorism and its 
economy, so I hypothesize that the closer a country is to an area with high levels of terrorism, the 
more likely the chance it is that its economy will be negatively affected.  
There is a plethora of information about the relationship between terrorism and economic 
growth, but nothing that focuses on the effect terrorism has on countries around a single terrorist 
“hot spot”. After exploring the different theories regarding how terrorism affects the economy, I 
examine whether those same effects hold true when focusing on the proximity of a country to 
areas with very high levels of terrorism. Later, I look specifically at the countries around Iraq and 
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Syria and operationalize the economic impacts by examining the GDP growth percentages of 
those countries over a period of time.  
 Before the effect of terrorism on economic growth can be examined, we must first deter-
mine whether terrorism has any correlation with economic growth. A study by Daniel Meierrieks 
and Thomas Gries tests for causality between terrorism and economic growth. Using a series of 
equations to test for Granger causality, they show that there is a causal effect between the two 
and found that “terrorism causally influences economic growth for the post-Cold War era” (Mei-
errieks and Gries 2012, 98). Now that it is evident that terrorism has some kind of correlation 
with economic growth, we can examine the nature of that correlation: Is it positive or negative, 
and is it significant or insignificant?  
The Nature of the Correlation Between Terrorism and Economic Growth 
Meierrieks and Gries find that the causal relationship between terrorism and growth is 
complex and heterogeneous over time and space. They explain that during the Cold War the 
economy influenced terrorism, while in the post-Cold War era terrorism influenced economic 
growth. What caused this change? They attribute it to ideological shifts, and explain that the rela-
tionship depends on a number of factors, including a country’s political stability and geograph-
ical and cultural affiliation. These factors and more can change the relationship between terror-
ism and the economy (Meierrieks and Gries 2012, 91-92).  
Alberto Abadie and Javier Gardeazabal say that, based on empirical evidence, they have 
good reason to believe that the consequences of terrorism usually have a large, negative effect on 
the economy (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2008). In a different article, using the Basque Country as 
a case study, they explain that “after the outbreak of terrorism, per capita GDP in the Basque 
Country declined about 10 percentage points relative to the synthetic control region” (Abadie 
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and Gardeazabal 2003). This gives us a good idea of what went on in the Basque Country since 
the decline of GDP happened after the outbreak of terrorism. But this is only one case study; I 
find it difficult to make a generalization about most countries based on just one region. Along 
those lines, there are other studies that reject the idea of a significant economic impact of terror-
ism.  
Blomberg et al. find that although terrorism has a negative impact on growth, it is statisti-
cally significant but economically small (Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides 2003, 24). José 
Tavares also confirms that terrorism has an immediate negative impact on growth, but says that 
after “controlling for the extra growth determinants, the incidence of terrorism becomes insignif-
icant”. He agrees that terrorism has impacts, but only on weak economies (Tavares 2003). Most 
importantly, the Global Terrorism Index concludes that “while economic growth and output can 
be negatively affected by acts of terrorism, there is not a uniform relationship across all 
countries”, and for most countries, terrorism does not have an important impact on economic 
growth (The Institute for Economics and Peace 2015 62-66). This caused me to rethink my per-
spective. Was the whole thing too complex and influenced by too many factors to isolate the 
specific effect terrorism has on the economy? I resolved to dig deeper into the specifics of how 
the economy could be affected.  
Direct Ways in which Terrorism affects Economic Growth 
Karin Glaser looks at the effects of terrorism on economic growth, capital markets, for-
eign trade, foreign direct investment, domestic investment, and government spending, employ-
ment and wages, and industry branches, especially tourism. Glaser explains that since stock pric-
es “reflect expectations of future market developments”, they are seen as a good way of perceiv-
ing economic damage. Terrorism, she says, lowers profit expectations due to “increased security 
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costs and a decrease in consumer demand”, especially in the tourism sector. Additionally, the 
uncertain environment that terrorism creates causes the risk premiums on the stocks to rise. Ter-
rorist activity--even the expectation of an attack--has negative effects on stock prices (Glaser 
2015. 77-78).  
But terrorism does not only affect stocks. A study on Israel by Eckstein and Tsiddon 
found negative effects on the GDP, consumption, investments, and exports.  (Eckstein and Tsid-
don 2004, 973). A separate paper by Chen and Siems concludes that “terrorist attacks and mili-
tary invasions have great potential to effect [sic] capital markets around the world in a short peri-
od of time” (Chen and Siems 2004, 350). As for foreign direct investment, Abadie and 
Gardeazabal suggest that terrorism has a significant impact on its allocation. Additionally, they 
conclude that there is a negative correlation between the incoming FDI and the terrorism risk, as 
well as between national income and terrorism risk (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2008, 11). But 
looking at this critically, I found it important to remember that correlation does not equal causa-
tion.  Not only this, the Global Terrorism Index disagrees with Abadie, arguing that in except in 
countries with very high levels of terrorism, “terrorism does not have a meaningful impact on 
economic growth and foreign direct investment” (The Institute for Economics and Peace 2015, 
62). This seems to be contradicted when Glaser reports on the effect of ISIL in Syria (2015, 9-
10), stating:  
In 2011, the starting year of the crisis, GDP growth dropped to -3.4% and continued de-
clining by -21.8% in 2012 and -22.5% in 2013 (World Bank 2014a). According to World 
Bank reports, Syria’s GDP strongly depends on oil and agriculture and its main sources 
of foreign earnings, that are exports of oil and services, are strongly impacted by the 
[conflict between the government and rebel groups, including ISIL]. 
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But this actually holds with what the GTI said; Syria is a country with very high levels of terror-
ism, which means that these reported impacts follow along with their theory.  
Effects Based on Proximity 
 Now that we have explored the correlation that terrorism has with economic growth and 
some of the specific ways in which it can affect it, we can finally turn to the effect terrorism has 
on a country based on its proximity to areas with high levels of terrorism. How can we define 
high levels of terrorism? According to the Global Terrorism Index, the highest activity is in Iraq, 
Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria. Out of ten, they scored a 10, 9.213, 9.065, and 8.108 
on the Index, respectively (The Institute 2015, 10). I took these five countries and sorted them 
into three areas: The Nigeria area, the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, and the Iraq-Syria area. 
Around each area, I created three approximate proximity rings. The first ring consisted of coun-
tries that border at least one of the countries in the defined area. The second ring consisted of 
countries that did not border the area but were still relatively close. The third ring consisted of 
countries that were a medium or far distance away, at least compared to the distances of the 
countries in the previous rings (i.e., Kazakhstan was in the third ring for the Afghanistan-
Pakistan area).  
Within these rings, I separated them by their score on the GTI; though the level of terror-
ist activity in the receiving country is not a part of my hypothesis, I was interested to see if there 
was a correlation. After obtaining each country’s GDP over a period of roughly sixteen years 
(2000- 2015 or 2016), and focusing on their 2016 rating as it compared to their 2000 and 2010 
GDP percentage, as well as any peaks or valleys they had experienced, I tried to establish a gen-
eral trend. What I found was baffling. There was no uniform relationship. Some countries had a 
generally upward trend, while many had a generally downward trend. The intensity of these 
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trends also had no uniform relationship. For example, Kazakhstan had a heavily downward trend, 
despite being in the third ring from the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, and in the second ring, Uz-
bekistan strongly increased from 2000 and decreased only slightly from 2010. In order to better 
illustrate this, I will focus on the Iraq-Syria area and explain the countries’ GDP trends as they 
do or do not correlate to their rings (recall; rings here are the informal measure of proximity). 
Specific GDP Research and Conclusions* 
 
Ring 
(indicates 
relative 
proximity to 
Iraq-Syria 
area) 
Country GDP growth 
percentage 
2000 
GDP growth 
percentage 
2010 
Peak/Valley GDP growth 
percentage 
2015 or most 
recent 
Ring 1 Turkey 5.18% 7.573% ‘09, -6.051% 2.475% 
Ring 1 Lebanon -1.122% 4.126% ‘11, -3.65% -2.632% 
Ring 1 Jordan 2.576% -1.605% ‘04, 5.853% -0.023% 
Ring 2 Saudi Arabia 2.088% 2.222% ‘11, 7.294% 1.34% 
Ring 2 Armenia 6.51% 2.29% ‘09, -
13.892% 
2.606% 
Ring 3 Yemen 3.253% 0.525% ‘11, -
17.341% 
‘13 1.502% 
Ring 3 Oman 4.746% -1.665% ‘11, -9.295% -2.365% 
 
 
* GDP percentages from The World Bank 
 
 The above table describes the GDP growth percentage rates of the countries around the 
Iraq-Syria area as reported by The World Bank. These numbers seem to suggest some sort of 
generally downward pattern; 7/7 of the countries’ GDP percentages went down from 2000, 4/7 
went down from 2010, and of those that did not, the margin of increase was small. Additionally, 
3/7 experienced a notable valley in 2011, while two others experienced one in 2009. Only 2/7 
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had peaks more worth noting than their valleys. Though this shows some sort of negative trend, 
it is unclear what role terrorism plays in it. Naturally, there are many factors that go into calculat-
ing a country’s GDP growth rate. It seems to me that it is difficult to attribute the increase or de-
crease of GDP rates to one specific cause. Even if we assume, just for the sake of argument, that 
there is a direct, significant correlation between these GDP growth rates and terrorism, the results 
are still unclear. Recall the main question we are trying to answer: How does proximity to strong-
ly terrorist-controlled areas affect a country’s economy?  
 If we look at each ring, there is no uniform behavior among them. Each ring contains one 
country whose GDP went down from 2010. 2/3 of the countries in the first ring experienced 
strong valleys, 1/2 in the second ring did, and 2/2 in the third ring did. If we attribute this to ter-
rorism (which may or may not have been the factor causing the decrease), it does not support my 
hypothesis. Taking only this into account, it seems that the countries farther away were more af-
fected; in fact, it was in the third ring that a country experienced the most drastic drop in GDP 
growth percentages (Yemen experienced a -17.341% valley in 2011). But if we look at the other 
two areas, Afghanistan-Pakistan and Nigeria, we will see that the rings behave differently yet 
again, and the results seem to have no pattern.  
The Afghanistan-Pakistan area and the Nigeria area both contained countries whose per-
centages had generally gone up, strongly up, down, or strongly down, with no distinction be-
tween the rings. Chad, which I put in the second ring of the Nigeria area, went from 13.55% in 
2010 to 1.8% in 2015, with an extreme peak in 2004 of 33.629%. In contrast, Cameroon (in the 
first ring), had a steady increase of 4.307% from 2009 to 2015 (The Institute 2015), with no val-
leys along the way. The erratic behavior of second-ring Chad and the surprisingly positive and 
steady behavior of first-ring Cameroon calls into question the importance of proximity. The re-
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sults in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area do this as well. For example, third-ring Kazakhstan has a 
downward trend and first-ring Turkmenistan went slightly upward from 2000 but down from 
2010. The results in the three areas seem to disagree within themselves and among each other.  
When we combine this with the already complex relationship between terrorism and the 
economy (complex because of the many different factors such as political stability that can also 
affect the economy), everything seems very unclear. What exactly affects what? Perhaps it is the 
level of terrorism in the ring countries that makes the difference. That is not it, either. As I previ-
ously mentioned, I separated the countries in each ring by their score on the GTI. That also 
yielded no correlation; some went up, and some went down; some had notable valleys, and some 
had notable peaks. Here I felt compelled to draw on the work of scholars who examined the GDP 
trends without respect to terrorism, as I thought it might help shed some light on why a country’s 
GDP increased or decreased when I hypothesized they would do the opposite.  
Other Economic Factors that Influence GDP 
Using the general economic trends of sub-Saharan Africa, I will examine the Nigeria area 
and the countries in its rings: Ring 1: Cameroon, Benin, and Togo, Ring 2: Ghana and Chad, and 
Ring 3: Mali, Gabon, and Côte d’Ivoire. In an article on the economic trends of Africa South of 
the Sahara, Donald Sparks notes that in 2015, growth in about half of the countries dropped sig-
nificantly: This was seen in most petroleum exporters and others that exported non-fuel minerals, 
like Ghana. Additionally, countries recovering from the Ebola Virus and those suffering from 
drought took an economic hit. For those who do not rely as much on commodity exports and 
who import oil, growth changed very little. A small group of countries that saw a “decrease in 
conflict … improved business environments (Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal), decent agricultural 
output or  lower oil and energy prices” saw their economies strengthen (Sparks 2016). Things 
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like public investment programs, industry, agriculture, oil prices/production, and political turmoil 
all play a role in the strength of a country’s economy.  
The impact of these factors could potentially suppress any small impact terrorism has on 
the economy. Cameroon, for example, has seen a consistent increase in its GDP percentage rates 
since 2009. This is despite the fact that it borders Nigeria, which holds the third highest score on 
the GTI.  So why does terrorism not seem to affect its economy? Perhaps it does, but the effects 
of other factors are stronger. Sparks notes that “Cameroon continued its trajectory of solid 
growth driven by agriculture and forestry, construction, industry and oil production, despite se-
curity problems in parts of its northern border region” (Sparks 2016), which may suggest sup-
pression of negative, terrorist-induced effects.  
On the other hand, if we look at Lebanon and Jordan, which are both in the first ring of 
the Iraq-Syria area, we do see effects. As Karin Glaser notes: “Besides the direct economic ef-
fects of the crisis on the Syrian economy, spillover effects have severe impacts on the economies 
of neighboring countries, especially Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq” (Glaser 2015, 10). She explains 
that this can be largely attributed to the influx of refugees fleeing the violence in Syria. She goes 
on to say that analysts expected the GDP in Lebanon to decline as a result of this; they also ex-
pected to see a loss in “wages, profits, business activities, consumption, exports, and investment” 
(Glaser 2015, 11). This is an example of countries that were affected by close proximity to the 
center of a major terrorist area. 
Analysis  
It is perplexing that we see an impact in some cases and not in others. After reviewing the 
information from other sources and my own research, as well as seeing how unpredictable the 
GDP growth rates can be and how often their proximity seems to have no effect on their econo-
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my, I decided to form a new hypothesis. Looking back at the opposing points of view on the rela-
tionship between terrorism and the economy, I agree with Meierrieks and Gries, who posited that 
the relationship is complex and the economic consequences have the potential to be significant 
but are influenced by other factors (Meierrieks and Gries 2012). I also have great respect for 
Tavares, who, after taking into account additional factors that affect GDP, found no significant 
effect of terrorism on economic growth (Tavares 2003). But I agree most fully with the Global 
Terrorism Index, which declares that “while economic growth and output can be negatively af-
fected by acts of terrorism, there is not a uniform relationship across all countries” (The Institute 
for Economics and Peace 2015 62-66).  
More specific to my research question, I believe that there is no uniform relationship be-
tween a country’s proximity to high levels of terrorism and its GDP; although terrorism can cer-
tainly have direct and indirect effects on the economy, those effects are often negligible com-
pared to other economic factors. This can sometimes cause the effects to overridden by stronger 
factors. I cannot conclude that countries closer to the five countries with the highest scores on the 
GTI have a higher chance of a decline in GDP or economic growth because the relationship is 
simply too complex and unpredictable. I also cannot isolate the specific effect that proximity to 
terrorism has on those countries’ economies.  
Conclusion 
The relationship between terrorism, proximity to terrorism, and the economy is extremely 
complex; in fact, international relations itself is more interconnected that I had previously under-
stood. I went in thinking that there was often a clear, logical sequence of cause and effect in in-
ternational issues, but instead I found that the chain of cause and effect can be extremely ambig-
uous. The number of important factors interconnecting issues is enormous, which makes it very 
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difficult to pinpoint correlation and causation. I learned to appreciate that intricacy, which must 
be handled carefully, and discovered that it is important to not make generalized assumptions 
based on a single case study or a lone point of view. Translating this to my particular research 
topic, I realized that given the global increase in terrorism, it is important to try to understand the 
effect proximity to terrorism has on a country’s economy, but it is also important to not misinter-
pret activity that goes on in different countries. After all, the implementation of a policy based on 
an incorrect conclusion can be just as disastrous as sitting back and allowing terrorism to sys-
tematically destroy the economy of a region of the Earth.  
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